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Cost Performance of Public Infrastructure Projects: The 34 
Nemesis and Nirvana of Change-Orders 35 
 36 
Abstract: The cost performance of a wide range of public sector infrastructure projects 37 
completed by a contractor are analyzed and discussed. Change-orders after a contract to 38 
construct an asset was signed were, on average, found to contribute to a 23.75% increase in 39 
project costs. A positive association between an increase in change orders and the contractor’s 40 
margin was identified. Taxpayers pay for this additional cost, while those charged with 41 
constructing assets are rewarded with an increase in their margins. As the public sector embraces 42 
an era of digitization, there is a need to improve the integration of design and construction 43 
activities and engender collaboration to ensure assets can be delivered cost effectively and 44 
future-proofed.  The research paper provides empirical evidence for the public sector to re-45 
consider the processes that are used to deliver their infrastructure assets so as to reduce the 46 
propensity for cost overruns and enable future-proofing to occur.  47 
 48 
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Introduction 56 
Cost overruns have been and continue to be the bête noire for the public sector in Australia 57 
(Love et al., 2015a; Love et al., 2017a;b); this also is a problem worldwide (Flyvbjerg et al., 58 
2002; Cantarelli et al., 2012; Odeck, 2014). Cantarelli et al. (2012) has revealed that the size of 59 
the cost overrun that can materialize (i.e., from the decision to build to a project’s practical 60 
completion) varies by geographical region. Similarly, Flyvbjerg (2008) has declared that specific 61 
types of transportation infrastructure projects (e.g., rail, roads, and bridges) display similar cost 62 
overrun profiles, irrespective of their geographical location, the technology used, and contractual 63 
method employed in their delivery.   64 
 65 
A significant problem that has been consistently identified as a contributor to increasing an 66 
asset’s construction costs is the quality of the contractual documentation that is produced (e.g., 67 
Jarkas, 2014). The errors and omissions that often materialize in contract documentation, for 68 
example, typically do not come to light until construction has commenced, and can therefore 69 
result in change-orders occurring (i.e. additional work and/or rework). Fundamentally, change-70 
orders lead to unintended consequences; in their basic form this is an increase in project costs for 71 
the public-sector client, but for contractors it can result in increased margins. There has been a 72 
tendency to overlook this dynamic, as data is not readily available due to commercial 73 
confidentiality. A change-order is essentially a client’s written instruction (or their 74 
representative) to a contractor, issued after the execution of a construction contract, which 75 
authorizes a change to the work being undertaken and contract time and/or amount.  76 
 77 
 78 
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In this paper, the cost performance of a wide range of infrastructure projects (n=67) completed 79 
between 2011 to 2014 are analyzed and discussed to illustrate the prevailing problem that 80 
confronts the public sector when it opts to use traditional (design-bid-construct) procurement 81 
methods or variants thereof to deliver their assets.   The research presented in this paper provides 82 
much needed empirical evidence for the public sector to re-consider the processes that are used 83 
to deliver their infrastructure assets so as to reduce the propensity of cost overruns occurring and 84 
ensure better value-for-money (VfM) to the taxpayer. 85 
 86 
Cost Performance 87 
For the public sector, managing the cost performance of their portfolio of projects is essential to 88 
ensure taxpayers are being provided with an asset that is able to deliver VfM; this is a critical 89 
metric, as it quantifies the cost efficiency of the work that is completed. Cost performance is 90 
generally defined as the value of the work completed compared to the actual cost of progress 91 
made on the project (Baccarini and Love, 2014). For the public sector, the ability to reliably 92 
predict the final cost of construction of an infrastructure asset whilst ensuring it does not 93 
experience a cost overrun is vital for the planning and resourcing of other projects or those in the 94 
pipeline. In this case, a cost overrun is defined as the ratio of the actual final costs of the project 95 
to the estimate made at full funds authorization measured in escalation-adjusted terms. Thus, a 96 
cost overrun is treated as the margin between the authorized initial project cost and the real final 97 
costs incurred after adjusting for expenditures due to escalation terms.  98 
 99 
Deloitte Access Economics (2014), for example, have revealed that on average, completed 100 
economic infrastructure projects in Australia experience a cost overrun of 6.5% in excess of their 101 
 5 
initial estimate. Moreover, projects in excess of AU$1 billion have been found to experience an 102 
average cost overrun of 12.7%. Higher values have been reported in Flyvbjerg et al. (2002) who 103 
examined the cost overruns of 258 transportation projects and revealed a mean cost overrun of 104 
32.8% from the budget established at the decision to build to the completion of construction. 105 
Contrastingly, Love (2002) found that cost overruns from the final tender sum to completion of 106 
construction for a sample 169 projects to possess a mean cost overrun of 12.6%. Terrill and 107 
Danks’s (2016) comprehensive analysis of 836 transportation infrastructure projects valued in 108 
excess of AU$20 million revealed that 90% of the total increase in costs incurred in Australia 109 
can be explained by 17% of projects that exceed their cost by more than 50%. In addition, Terrill 110 
and Danks (2016) revealed that 24% of projects exceeded the cost announced by the incumbent 111 
Government, and 9% were delivered under their publicized budget.   112 
 113 
The disparity between the reported magnitude of cost overruns that have been experienced arises 114 
due to the ‘point of reference’ from where they are determined in a project’s development 115 
process (Siemiatycki, 2009; Love et al. 2016). A review of the literature reveals cost overruns 116 
have been typically determined between the: (1) initial forecasted budget (i.e. base estimate) and 117 
actual construction cost (Cantarelli et al. 2012); (2) detailed planning stage and actual 118 
construction costs (Odeck, 2004); and (3) establishment of a contract value and actual 119 
construction costs (Love et al., 2015b).  120 
 121 
These differences, in part, arise as there is a tendency for public infrastructure projects to engage 122 
in a lengthy ‘definition’ period after the decision-to-build and a base estimate has been 123 
established. Needless to say, such a protracted period can result in projects being susceptible to 124 
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experiencing change-orders, which can lead to cost increases being incurred (Allen Consulting 125 
and the University of Melbourne, 2007). With this in mind, it is suggested that it is misleading to 126 
make direct comparisons between the base estimate at the time of the decision-to-build and 127 
actual construction costs, as the estimate that is initially prepared is typically based upon a 128 
conceptual design. As noted in Figure 1, the accuracy of an estimate improves as more 129 
information becomes available (e.g., scope is defined and users’ requirements are identified). In 130 
Figure 1, Ashworth’s (2008) percentage range for each type of estimate that is produced during 131 
the design development phase of a project is presented (p.251).  132 
 133 
 134 
Figure 1. Traditional cost scenario for infrastructure projects 135 
 136 
At this juncture, it is important to mention that the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors 137 
(RICS) under the auspices of the ‘New Rules of Measurement’ advocate that all estimates are 138 
expressed as a single figure (RICS, 2012). The use of such a precise figure is failing the basic 139 
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tests of validity: accuracy and precision (Newton, 2012). The inadequacies of the traditional 140 
estimating process are camouflaged by the use of deterministic percentage additions that take the 141 
form of a contingency, which cater for an increase in a project’s cost due to: (1) variability (i.e. 142 
random uncertainty); (2) risk events; and (3) unforeseeable situations (Baccarini and Love, 143 
2014). In stark contrast to the deterministic approach, it has been suggested the application of a 144 
probabilistic approach to determining a construction cost contingency based upon empirical 145 
analysis of a wide range of infrastructure projects should be applied (e.g. Baccarini and Love, 146 
2014).  147 
 148 
Generally, the construction contingency percentages applied to public infrastructure projects 149 
have been unable to accommodate increases in cost that are incurred. For example, Baccarini and 150 
Love (2014) analysis of 228 water infrastructure projects revealed that the mean percentage 151 
addition was 8.46% of their contract value, but the construction contingency requirement for the 152 
final cost was 13.58%; a shortfall in contingency in the region of 5%. The magnitude of this 153 
percentage addition, while evidently inaccurate, can vary with the nature of the project and the 154 
type of procurement method adopted. For example, in the case of a greenfield project that is 155 
being delivered via a traditional procurement method (e.g., Construct Only), the design and 156 
specifications (including drawings and Bills of Quantities (BoQ)) for a project are supposed to be 157 
complete at the award of a tender and thus a construction contingency between 2% and 5% is 158 
often provided. As a result, there is a perception that a high degree of cost certainty will ensue, 159 
but in reality this is fallacy, as complete drawings and BoQs are seldom available when a project 160 
goes to tender. As previously mentioned, they invariably contain errors and omissions, which can 161 
lead to change-orders and rework and increased construction costs (Love et al., 2012). 162 
 8 
 163 
Brownfield projects can be considered to be higher risk ventures than greenfield sites (e.g., due 164 
to geotechnical uncertainties, contaminated soil and neighboring structures). Thus, in the case of 165 
Brownfields projects, a public sector client may opt to use a non-traditional procurement route 166 
(e.g. Design and Construct) and transfer the associated risks for the development to a single-167 
entity as well as be provided with a Guaranteed Maximum Price, for the works. Any changes in 168 
the scope of work under this form of contractual arrangement, however, will require a client to 169 
pay a premium for any changes that are required. It is, therefore, necessary to have a sufficient 170 
contingency allowance in place should the need for amendments arise (De Marco et al., 2015).  171 
 172 
Explanations for Deviations in Cost Performance 173 
The literature is replete with explanations as to ‘how’ and ‘why’ the cost performance of public 174 
sector infrastructure projects deviates from their expected outturn cost (e.g., Pickrell, 1992; 175 
Bordat et al. 2004; Odeck, 2004; Siemiatycki, 2009; Odeck et al., 2015). According to Love et 176 
al. (2016) two schools of thought have emerged explaining deviations in the cost performance of 177 
infrastructure projects: (1) ‘Evolution Theorists’, who have suggested that cost deviations 178 
materialize as a result of changes in scope and definition between a project’s inception and 179 
completion. The Office of the Auditor General in Western Australia (2012), for example, 180 
revealed that changes in scope were the primary culprit that had contributed to cost overruns 181 
occurring in their major capital projects. Next are (2) ‘Psycho Strategists’ who have advocated 182 
that projects experience cost overruns due to deception, planning fallacy and unjustifiable 183 
optimism bias in establishing the initial cost targets (Flyvbjerg et al. 2002; Siemiatycki, 2009). 184 
According to Flyvbjerg (2003) those responsible for determining the budget for an infrastructure 185 
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project are often subjected to applying Machiavelli’s formula to ensure it is given approval to 186 
proceed: costs are underestimated (-), revenues are over estimated (+), environmental impacts 187 
undervalued (-) and development effects are overvalued (+) (p.43).  188 
 189 
Often estimators/planners only consider the information that is made available to them for the 190 
particular project they are involved with delivering; such a focus is referred to as having an 191 
‘inside view’ (Flyvbjerg et al., 2005). In particular, Kahneman and Lovallo (1993) observed that 192 
“the inside view is overwhelmingly preferred in intuitive forecasting. The natural way to think 193 
about a problem is to bring to bear all one knows about it, with special attention to its unique 194 
features” (p.26). Contrastingly, an ‘outside view’ recognizes that projects of a similar nature 195 
should be used as a reference point when assessing a project (Kahneman and Lovallo, 1993). By 196 
adopting an ‘outside view’ Flyvbjerg (2008) suggests that a more realistic forecast of cost can be 197 
acquired and thereby reduce the propensity for optimism bias to arise.   198 
 199 
In theory, the proposition that has been proposed by Flyvbjerg (2008) is plausible, however, in 200 
practice a different reality exists (Love et al., 2016). For example, Perth Arena’s initial budget 201 
estimate was established based on square meter rate with reference to Melbourne Park’s Multi-202 
Purpose Venue (formerly known as Vodafone Stadium and with a construction cost of AU$65 203 
million in 2000). The initial estimate was AU$165 million, which then increased to AU$343 204 
within two years, and with a final completion cost in excess of AU$550 million (Office of the 205 
Auditor General, 2010).  According to Love et al. (2016) both ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ views need 206 
to be adopted to adequately explain the causal nature of cost overruns. However, the research 207 
presented in this paper does not seek to explain ‘why’, but bring to the fore ‘how’ cost overruns 208 
 10 
occur by illustrating the direct financial consequences of poorly managed public infrastructure 209 
projects. At the time a project’s contract is signed, cost certainty should be affirmed, unless a 210 
form of cost-plus agreement is otherwise agreed.  211 
 212 
Illustrative Case Study 213 
Most research studies that have examined the cost performance of infrastructure projects have 214 
tended to rely upon heterogeneous datasets (e.g., Flyvbjerg et al., 2002; Cantarelli et al., 2012).  215 
Such datasets are loosely connected and thus there is a propensity for them to possess a 216 
considerable amount of ‘noise’, as a morass of missing information is adequately needed to 217 
explain the nature of a project’s cost performance (e.g. by way of an asset owners’ aims and 218 
objectives, planning requirements, contractors, project teams, technologies, and contractual 219 
arrangements). Instead, this research sought to obtain an ameliorated understanding of the impact 220 
of change-orders on the public sector and contractors financial performance.  221 
 222 
To illustrate how the cost performance of infrastructure projects varies and provide an insight to 223 
the problem that confronts the public sector, a case study is used (Fry et al., 1999). Typically, an 224 
illustrative case study is used to describe an event; they utilize one or two instances to 225 
demonstrate the reality of a situation (e.g., change-orders and margin). In this instance, the case 226 
study provides a platform to demonstrate that the cost performance of public sector projects has 227 
been mismanaged.  The case study serves to make the ‘unfamiliar, familiar’, and provide a 228 
common language for the nature of infrastructure projects’ cost performance. A homogenous 229 
dataset (i.e. in terms of processes, technologies, procedures and processes) from a contractor who 230 
completed a wide range of infrastructure projects between 2011 to 2014 are examined where 231 
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their final accounts had been completed; that is, the final payment made to the contractor on 232 
completion of the works described in the contract and payments owing being made at the end of 233 
the defects liability period (typically, 6-12 months after handover). Selecting only those projects 234 
that had their final accounts completed enabled an accurate assessment of their cost to be 235 
determined.  No project sampled was subjected to open tendering, and several were delivered 236 
within a Building Information Modelling (BIM) environment. Individual names, locations, and 237 
the Level of Development (LOD) specification of projects are withheld and the data aggregated 238 
for reasons of commercial confidentially. 239 
 240 
Analysis and Findings 241 
Cost data from 67 completed infrastructure projects were provided, which included their 242 
procurement method, original contract value (OCV), final contract value, contractor’s margin, 243 
total of client approved change-orders, and final contractor’s margin. Table 1 provides a 244 
summary of the types and procurement methods for the 67 infrastructure projects that were 245 
constructed throughout Australia within the study period (Table 1). ‘Building’ (n=16, 24%) (e.g., 246 
hospitals, schools and civic assets) and ‘Rail’ (n=16, 24%) and ‘Civil’ (n=22, 33%) (i.e., 247 
miscellaneous works such as dam upgrades and earthworks) were the most popular types of 248 
projects that were constructed. A variety of procurement methods were selected by the public 249 
sector to deliver their assets (Table 1); 65 (44%) were traditional ‘Construct Only’ lump sum 250 
contracts and the remainder being non-traditional methods with the most popular form being 251 
‘Design and Construct’, (n=13,19%). Tables 2 and 3 provide an overview of the cost 252 
performance parameters of projects and a breakdown by their type, respectively.   253 
 254 
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 255 
 256 
 257 
Table 1. Projects and procurement methods 258 
= 259 
Procurement Method  
 Construct 
Only 
Design and 
Construct 
Service 
Contract 
Alliance Construction 
Management 
Management 
Contracting 
EPC 
Project 
Type 
N (%) N (%) N(%) N(%) N(%) N(%) N(%) 
Rail 13(33) 2(15) 1(100) 1(100)     
Road 2(5) 1(7.5)      
Tunnel 3(7.5) 1(7.5)      
Civil 13(30) 4(30)    1(33) 3(100) 
Building 10(25) 2(15)   2 (5) 2(67)  
Power  3(7.5) 1(7.5)      
Water  1(2.5) 2(15)      
Total 44 (100) 13(100) 1(100) 1(100) 2(100) 3 (100) 3(100) 
 13 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for cost performance parameters 260 
 261 
Cost Parameter Minimum   Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Original Contract 
Value (OCV) 
$1,851,459 $318,307,311 $48,201,497 $58,619,500 
Cost Performance -42.88% 270.93% 23.75% 48.51% 
Final Contract 
Value 
$3,334,068 $453,869,568 $59,501,002 $81,674,335 
Original Margin $224,496 $31,543,968 $4,431,586 $6,278,123 
Final Margin $-38,204,212 $80,188,944** $6,171,254 $14,305,630 
Client Approved 
Change-Orders 
$-519,141 $80,655,072 $5,107,252 $11,364,666 
 262 
** Specific details are suppressed due to reasons of commercial in confidence. Similarly, this applies to the location of all projects  263 
 264 
 265 
 266 
 267 
 268 
 269 
 270 
 271 
 272 
 273 
 274 
 275 
 276 
 277 
 278 
 279 
 280 
 281 
 282 
 283 
 284 
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Table 3. Original contract values and approved change orders 285 
 286 
 287 
Project 
Type  
N Total value of 
projects ($) 
OCV 
Minimum 
Value ($) 
OCV 
Maximum 
Value ($) 
Mean 
Value ($) 
Mean 
Margin (%) 
Total Client Approved 
Change Orders ($) 
Rail  16 645,736,621 1,851,459 318,307,311 40,358,538 8.76 57,710,882 
Road  2 47,145,336 8,822,453 38,322,883 23,572,668 10.48 4,290 
Tunnel  4 230,234,197 30,179,736 102,465,401 57,558,549 10.61 23,244,545 
Civil  22 1.39E+9 4,970,945 224,575,457 63,0323,333 10.17 207,114,979 
Building  16 823,883,239 2,258,943 180,049,561 51,492,702 10.41 46,791,411 
Power  4 488,534,403 4,519,860 200,825,529 12,213,350 9.89 4,185,061 
Water  3 46,936,231 4,611,781 23,396,953 15,645,410 9.60 3,134,747 
Total 67 3.23E+9 1,851,459 318,307,311 48,201,497 9.89 342,185,917 
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Cost Performance 288 
The value of the contracts that had been awarded by the public sector varied, though a significant 289 
proportion were less than AU$100 million (n=55, 82%) as denoted in Figure 2. The contract 290 
value of the projects ranged from approximately AU$1.8 million to AU$318 million, with a 291 
mean of AU$48 million (Table 2). More specifically, ‘Civil’, (43%) ‘Building’ (25%) and ‘Rail’ 292 
(20%) project types accounted for a majority of the contractor’s turnover from 2011 to 2014 293 
(Table 3). 294 
 295 
 296 
Figure 2. Number of infrastructure projects 297 
 298 
It can be seen that the cost performance of projects ranged from -42.88% to + 270.93% of budget 299 
with a mean cost overrun of 23.75% as a proportion of the OCV. This finding is in stark contrast 300 
to Love (2002) who reported a mean cost overrun of 12.6% of the OCV, with 48% being 301 
attributable to change-orders and the remaining 52% being due to rework. All projects that 302 
utilized BIM to a minimum of LOD 300 experienced cost increases; in this instance, specific 303 
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model elements are demonstrated as specific assemblies accurate in terms of quantity, size, 304 
shape, location and orientation.  305 
A total of 67% (n=45) of projects incurred a cost overrun of less than 25% of the OCV and 9% 306 
(n=6) experienced a cost underrun. A Grubbs test was used to detect outliers from a Normal 307 
Distribution with the tested data being the minimum and maximum values (Grubbs, 1950). The 308 
result is a probability that belongs to the core population being examined. So, if the data is 309 
approximately normally distributed, then outliers are required to have Z-scores ± 3. Outliers 310 
possessing a Z-score in the range ± 2 to 3 can be considered to be ‘borderline’ outliers. As 311 
denoted in Figure 3, two projects were identified as being ‘borderline’ with Z-scores being 312 
between +2 and +3 and two outright outliers being in excess of +4. Considering these Z-scores, 313 
the ‘best fit’ distribution was determined. Considering the outliers that were present, a Normal 314 
Distribution was not deemed to be the ‘best fit’ distribution’ for the data.  315 
 316 
 317 
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Figure 3. Determination of outliers for cost performance 320 
 321 
The ‘best fit’ probability distribution for ‘cost performance’ was examined so that probability of 322 
cost deviations (i.e., underruns and overrun) could be determined at the point of contract award 323 
(Love et al., 2013); the computation of such a distribution is both pertinent to the public sector 324 
and contractors as part of formulating a risk management strategy for their projects. A caveat, 325 
however, needs to be made here; the data’s homogeneity would likely provide a more accurate 326 
assessment of risk for the contractor, but could provide public sector clients with ‘ballpark’ 327 
probabilities to formulate future construction contingencies. ‘Underruns’ and ‘overruns’ should 328 
be separated when examining cost performance, but considering the limited number of projects 329 
that were below the agreed contract value it was decided to combine them together in this case.   330 
 331 
Using the ‘Goodness of Fit’ Kolmogorov-Smirnov (D), and Anderson-Darling (A2) tests it was 332 
revealed that Generalized Extreme Value (GEV) distribution with parameters k = 0.51, σ = 11.98, 333 
μ = 4.43 was identified as the ‘best fit’ solution for examining the cost performance for the 334 
sample of projects.  The Kolmogorov-Smirnov (K-S) test revealed a D statistic of 0.13 with a P-335 
value of 0.17. The Anderson-Darling (A-D) statistic A2 was revealed to be 5.21. The K-S test 336 
accepted the Null Hypothesis (i.e., H0 where it is assumed that there is no difference in 337 
parameters) for the sample distribution’s ‘best fit’ at the critical nominated α values of 0.2, and at 338 
0.01 for the A-D test. The resulting GEV probability density function (PDF) is expressed as: 339 
 340 
𝑓(𝑥) = {
1
𝜎
exp⁡(−(1 + 𝑘𝑧)−
1
𝑘)(1 + 𝑘𝑧)−1−
1
𝑘⁡⁡𝑘 ≠ 0
1
𝜎
exp(−𝑧 − exp(−𝑧)) ⁡⁡𝑘 = 0
      [Eq.1] 341 
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 342 
where z=(x-μ)/σ, and k, σ, μ are the shape, scale, and location parameters respectively. The scale 343 
must be positive (sigma>0), the shape and location can take on any real value. However, the 344 
range of definition for the GEV distribution depends on k:  345 
 346 
1 + 𝑘
(𝑥 − 𝜇)
𝜎 > 0⁡⁡⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑘 ≠ 0⁡
−∞ < 𝑥 < +∞⁡⁡⁡⁡𝑓𝑜𝑟⁡𝑘 = 0
 
            [Eq.2] 347 
 348 
Using the GEV PDF the probability of cost overrun of 23.75% is 73% (P=0.73). The proportion 349 
of projects (67%) that experienced less than 25% cost overrun had a mean of 7.9%; the 350 
probability a project exceeds its OCV is 0.58%. 351 
 352 
The detailed financial summaries provided to the researchers by the contractor revealed that 353 
client change-orders contributed to the cost deviations that were subjected to public sector 354 
clients’ approval. Non-conformances also materialized in the projects, but the rectification costs 355 
did not impact the final contract value paid by the clients as these were the responsibility of the 356 
subcontractors and suppliers. 357 
 358 
The correlation analysis presented in Table 4 reveals that the size of a project in terms of its 359 
OCV, its type, and the procurement method used were not significantly related with cost 360 
performance (p <0.01). Studies examining the relationship between project size and the extent of 361 
cost overrun that is incurred remains inconclusive and has been the subject of debate (e.g., 362 
Odeck, 2004; Love et al., 2013). In pursuing this unresolved issue, the analysis sought to 363 
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determine if there was a significant difference between a project’s size (i.e. OCV) and cost 364 
performance.365 
 20 
 366 
Table 4. Correlations between project characteristics and cost measures 367 
Variable 
Project 
Type 
Procurement 
Method 
Project 
Size 
Cost 
Performance 
% 
Original 
Margin 
% Final 
Margin to 
OCV 
Project Type 1 
     Procurement Method 0.11 1 
    Project Size 0.06 0.21 1 
   Cost Performance -0.11 0.15 -0.05 1 
  
% of Margin of OCV 
0.07 0.11 -0.01 0.20 1 
 
% of Final Margin to 
OCV 
-0.24 -0.11 -.38** .46** -0.04 1 
       
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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A one-way Analysis of the Variance (ANOVA) was used in this instance to test for differences. 368 
Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances was not found to be violated (p <0.05), which 369 
indicates the population variances for project size and cost performance were equal. Thus, there 370 
were no significant differences between ‘project size’ and cost performance, F (4,62) = 1.096, p 371 
<0.05). Furthermore, to determine whether there was a difference between procurement methods 372 
and cost performance, a t-test was undertaken using the categories of ‘traditional’ and ‘non-373 
traditional’.  374 
 375 
Table 5 presents the mean and standard deviation for the cost performances for categorized 376 
procurement types, and the results of the t-test are presented in Table 6. At the 95% confidence 377 
interval, no significant difference in cost performance was experienced in projects delivered 378 
under the different procurement categorizations that were established. Akin with previous 379 
research it can be concluded that cost performance does not significantly vary with the 380 
procurement methods employed (e.g., Love, 2002). 381 
 382 
Table 5. Cost performance for procurement types 383 
 384 
Procurement Type N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Traditional 44 18.19 45.81 6.90 
Non-traditional 23 35.87 53.43 11.39 
 385 
 386 
 387 
 388 
 389 
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 390 
Table 6. t-test for difference between cost performance and procurement types 391 
 392 
 Levene’s 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t equality of-
Test for 
means 
     
 F 
 
Sig. T df. Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
difference 
Std. error 
difference 
Lower Upper 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
0.53 0.46 -1.39 65 0.16 -17.67 12.65 -42.95 7.59 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  -1.32 36.84 0.19 -17.67 13.32 -44.67 9.31 
 393 
 394 
Change-Orders 395 
The mean amount of client approved change-orders that occurred in projects was approximately 396 
AU$5.1 million (10.6%) (Table 2). In addition, the total change-orders accounted for 11% of the 397 
value of the work that was undertaken by the contractor between 2011 and 2014 (Table 3). To 398 
determine if there was a significant difference between the change-orders and project size an 399 
ANOVA was undertaken. Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances was found to be violated 400 
(p = 0.00), which indicates the population variances for project size and cost performance were 401 
not equal. Significant differences between change-orders and project size were found to occur, F 402 
(4,62) = 5.525, p <0.01). A Tukey’s HSD post-hoc tested showed that projects with lower a OCV 403 
experienced smaller volumes of change-orders (p <0.05). 404 
 405 
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 406 
Margin 407 
According to the NAO (2013) there is limited available knowledge and a lack of transparency 408 
surrounding the margins of contractors. In contributing to this gap in knowledge, the analysis 409 
revealed that the contractor’s mean margin (excluding overheads) was 9.89% of the OCV. Table 410 
3 provides a breakdown of the mean margin allocated for each type of project, which ranged 411 
from 8.76% to 10.61%.  412 
 413 
The lowest record margin was 3.98% of the OCV for a ‘Civil’ project that had an OCV of 414 
AU$48.4 million and a final contract value of AU$65.9 million. However, in this project the 415 
contractor’s expected margin at the commencement of the works was AU$3.8 million, but 416 
declined to AU$3.2 million (-15.57%) due to issues surrounding rework, which they were 417 
accountable for.  This scenario was observed in several projects, for example, an AU$64.7 418 
million ‘Construct Only’ ‘Civil’ project that had an expected margin of AU$2.9 million. With 419 
the client issuing scope changes, the final contract value was AU$61.6 million, a cost underrun 420 
of 4.06%. The contractor experienced a staggering loss of AU$38.2 million, which occurred due 421 
to an array of issues that included rework, product non-conformances and delays to works (Table 422 
2).  Disastrous projects of this nature can, and more often than not, usually result in contractors 423 
being liquidated. If, however, as in this case, they are able to shoulder such costs, then their stock 424 
value, reputation and image within the public and private sectors and the general community can 425 
be adversely impacted.  Losses in one project can be offset against gains in others that form part 426 
of a contractor’s portfolio of work in progress. For example, the maximum recorded final margin 427 
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as noted in Table 2 was AU$80.18 million for a project that had an OCV in excess of AU$1 428 
billion and incurred a cost increase of 7.5%. 429 
The project that had the highest margin (> 30%) was a ‘Building’ project with an OCV of 430 
AU$3.38 million, which increased by 25.76% in value to AU$4.87 million due to change-orders. 431 
In contrast to the aforementioned example, this project’s margin increased from an expected 432 
value of AU$641,608 to AU$1.37 million (114.33%).  Surprisingly, the projects with margins in 433 
excess of 20% of their OCV varied in size, type, and location. Figure 4 identifies three 434 
‘borderline’ and two ‘outlier’ projects that possessed high margins. For example, a ‘Civil’ 435 
project had an OCV of $138 million with a margin of 22.82%. Conversely, a ‘Building’ project 436 
had an OCV of AU$2.5 million with a margin of 28.98%.  437 
 438 
 439 
 440 
 441 
Figure 4. Determination of outliers for margin 442 
 443 
-5
-4
-3
-2
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35 37 39 41 43 45 47 49 51 53 55 57 59 61 63 65Z
-s
c
o
re
 
Number of Projects 
Value Z-score
26.411 2.868
22.824 2.238
26.616 2.904
28.978 3.318
32.327 3.907
 25 
 444 
Considering the prevailing ‘outliers’ the ‘best fit’ distribution was computed, and can ceteris 445 
paribus be used to determine the likelihood of a contractor’s margin by the public sector. As 446 
above, the K-S and A-D ‘Goodness of Fit’ tests were undertaken. The results of the ‘Goodness of 447 
Fit’ tests revealed that the Wakeby distribution provided the ‘best fit’ for the dataset.  The K-S 448 
test revealed a D-statistic of 0.07573 with a P-value of 0.80413 and the A-D statistic A
2 
was 449 
revealed to be 0.47668 at the critical nominated α values of 0.01.   The Wakeby is a form of GEV 450 
distribution.  The parameters of a Wakeby, α β γ δ ξ are all continuous.  The domain for this 451 
distribution is expressed as , if  and ,  if  or . The 452 
distribution parameters for the range were α = 21.367, β = 4.5569, γ = 1.71, δ =0.45437, 453 
ξ=3.0078.   The Wakeby distribution is defined by the quantile function (i.e. inverse CDF): 454 
 455 
       [Eq.3] 456 
 457 
The Wakeby PDF is used to determine the likelihood of a mean of 9.89% margin if applied to a 458 
project; in this instance, there is a 62% (P=0.62) probability that this margin would be applied. 459 
 460 
The mean margin OCV contract award for various sizes of projects can be seen in Table 7. It can 461 
be seen the mean margins do not significantly vary between one and another rendering the 462 
Wakeby distribution identified above as a basis for determining the likely margin that would be 463 
applied. Levene’s test for homogeneity of variances confirms this observation as it was not found 464 
to be violated (p <0.05), which indicates the population variances for project size and margin are 465 
x  0   x 0 0
     






 FFFx 1111)(
 26 
equal. Thus, there were no significant differences between ‘project size’ and margin, F (4,62) = 466 
3.04., p <0.05). A significant association, however, was found to be present with the percentage 467 
increase of the final margin with project size, r=-038, n=67, p < 0.01, two tails and cost 468 
performance and r=-046, n=67, p < 0.01, two tails. It can be therefore implied that the likelihood 469 
of an increase in expected margin at contract decreases with smaller OCVs. In addition, the 470 
margins of a contractor increase as a project experiences larger cost overruns. 471 
 472 
To determine whether there was a difference between procurement methods and margin, a t-test 473 
was undertaken using the categories of ‘traditional’ and ‘non-traditional’. Table 8 presents the 474 
mean and standard deviation for the cost performances for categorized procurement types, and 475 
the results of the t-test are presented in Table 9. At the 95% confidence interval, no significant 476 
difference in margins was determined under the different procurement categorizations that were 477 
established.  478 
 479 
Table 7. Size and margin % of contract value 480 
Project Size N Mean (%) Minimum (%)  Maximum 
(%) 
Std. Deviation 
$1-$20m 28 10.26 3.98 32.33 6.15 
$21-$50m 17 8.54 0.00 26.41 5.79 
$51-$100m 10 10.60 4.01 26.62 6.69 
$101-$200m 10 10.32 6.17 22.82 4.81 
>$201m 2 9.91 9.91 10.04 0.91 
Total 67 9.89 0.00 32.33 5.79 
 481 
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 482 
Table 8. Margin for procurement types 483 
 484 
Procurement Type N Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Std. Error 
Mean 
Traditional 44 9.56 5.50 0.82 
Non-traditional 23 10.61 6.52 1.39 
 485 
 486 
Table 9. t-test for difference between contractor’s margin and procurement types 487 
 488 
 Levene’s 
Test for 
Equality of 
Variances 
t equality of-
Test for 
means 
     
 F 
 
Sig. T df. Sig. 
(2-
tailed) 
Mean 
difference 
Std. error 
difference 
Lower Upper 
Equal 
variances 
assumed 
0.32 0.56 -0.68 65 0.49 -1.04 1.52 -4.09 2.01 
Equal 
variances 
not 
assumed 
  -0.64 36.31 0.52 -1.04 1.62 -4.32 2.24 
 489 
 490 
The dominant paradigm within the public sector assumes that differing procurement options can 491 
provide varying degrees of cost certainty and will influence the level of a contractor’s margin, 492 
which is a reflection of their risk profile; the findings presented from this illustrative case study 493 
suggest the contrary, and provide a basis for the public sector to better understand the unintended 494 
consequences of change-orders that can arise during the delivery of their assets.  The level of a 495 
contractor’s margin is a small component of their cost, yet having an understanding of this 496 
amount is important, as the balance of risk and reward can distort their behavior if they are not 497 
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aligned (Love et al., 2011). Thus, the balance of risk and reward is dependent upon the structure 498 
of the contract and how well it is managed (NAO, 2013).  499 
 500 
Discussion 501 
What matters most to the taxpayer is whether contracted out services can provide improved 502 
quality at an appropriate overall cost (NAO, 2013: p.15). Taxpayers concerns, however, are not 503 
being adequately addressed; evidence of this can be seen with the sheer number of public sector 504 
projects that have and continue to experience cost overruns. This is not to say that the public 505 
sector is neglecting such concerns; quite the contrary, as it is acknowledged that significant effort 506 
has been undertaken to redress the issues that adversely impact the delivery of infrastructure 507 
projects. After all public-sector employees are also taxpayers and therefore there should be a 508 
resounding motivation for them to ensure assets and services are delivered, operated and 509 
maintained cost effectively. However, despite noble intentions, there is a residing suspicion that 510 
spending other peoples’ money on other people absolves them from any form of accountability, 511 
which often results in assets not providing the VfM that was initially intended.  This case in point 512 
was originally highlighted by Milton Friedman (2004) who perceptively stated: “I can spend 513 
somebody else's money on somebody else. And if I spend somebody else's money on somebody 514 
else, I'm not concerned about how much it is, and I'm not concerned about what I get. And that's 515 
government”. 516 
 517 
The magnitude of change-orders that occurs in projects is troublesome and hinders public sector 518 
ability to cost effectively ensure the asset being delivered is ‘future proofed’; that is, resilient to 519 
unexpected events and adaptable to changing needs, uses or capacities. Changes during 520 
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construction may lead to sub-optimal solutions (e.g., design, functionality, materials, running 521 
costs) being incorporated into an asset’s fabric to minimize cost and meet the committed 522 
completion date.  523 
 524 
Irrespective of the procurement strategy adopted, change-orders were found to materialize during 525 
construction. An analysis of the nature of change-orders is outside the remit of this paper, but it 526 
was observed that changes in scope, and errors and omissions in documentation predominated. 527 
Such levels of change indicate that the ‘design’ process has not been effectively managed, 528 
irrespective of the procurement option, and the use of BIM, though as noted this was only used 529 
in a limited number of projects. The authors did not have access to the construction contingency 530 
of the public-sector clients, but a deterministic figure between 2% and 5% (Baccarini and Love 531 
2014), which is often applied would have obviously been inadequate for the sampled projects. 532 
Prior to the commencement of construction, a contingency in excess of this value would be 533 
unacceptable for the public sector, as there is unequivocally a need for cost certainty. But, there 534 
remains the ‘elephant in the room’, with no party wanting to be held accountable for contributing 535 
to the development and production of an incomplete scope and poor quality tender 536 
documentation. Naturally, contractors will submit a bid based upon the information that they 537 
have been provided and may opportunistically price items within the BoQ where they anticipate 538 
future changes to materialize to maximize their margin.  539 
 540 
In light of the status quo, cost overruns due to change-orders will continue to prevail and could 541 
even be exacerbated as there is a misconception that digitization of the design process enabled by 542 
the use of BIM will reduce errors and omissions. Simply superimposing a 21
st 
century innovation 543 
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such as
 
BIM to procurement practices where contracts do not wholly support collaborative 544 
working and have been essentially developed for the 20
th
 century, will not leverage the benefits 545 
that can be afforded from its adoption. Thus, to mitigate change-orders, behavioral, cultural, 546 
legal and structural issues associated with the delivery of public sector assets need to be 547 
transformed to effectively accommodate the benefits that can be afforded by BIM, especially if 548 
they are to be future-proofed. The inclusion of contractors and asset managers in the design 549 
process is needed to help reduce changes using visualization and enable future-proofing to take 550 
place (Figure 5). This can be done by ensuring the information needed to effectively operate and 551 
maintain an asset is captured and provided in a usable format that is readily accessible (Figure 6).  552 
 553 
  
(a) A 3D visualization of what is to be constructed (b) Actually constructed 
  
Figure 5.  3D visualization 554 
 555 
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  556 
Figure 6. Centralization of asset information for operations and maintenance 557 
 558 
Considerable effort has been and continues to be made to address the aforementioned issues to 559 
support the digitization of assets throughout their life-cycle, particularly in the United Kingdom 560 
(e.g. Construction Industry Council, 2014). While such efforts provide the building blocks for 561 
enabling the much-needed transformational change, many public-sector agencies are still ‘sitting 562 
on the fence’ with regard to rolling out BIM and implementing the new procurement practices 563 
that are required, despite being cognizant of the problems associated with existing approaches of 564 
asset delivery. Indeed, this is a bold proposition, however, if the public sector is to make 565 
headway in ensuring that assets are delivered cost effectively, then a charter focusing on 566 
procurement reform needs to be initiated, managed and maintained; changes initiated in the past 567 
have been ephemeral.    568 
 569 
 570 
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 571 
Conclusion 572 
Public infrastructure projects that experience cost overruns adversely impact taxpayers. It is 573 
therefore imperative that they are not only delivered within budget but also continue to be of 574 
value into the future. Providing infrastructure that is resilient and adaptable to changing needs, 575 
capacities and uses should be the ultimate goal of the public sector. The path to attaining this 576 
goal can be derailed when change-orders (e.g., in scope) are required during construction, and 577 
can lead to sub-optimal assets being delivered. The taxpayer pays for this additional cost, while 578 
contractors are rewarded with an increase in their margins; this is the ‘elephant in the room’ 579 
within the public sector, which is underpinned by ‘spending somebody else's money on 580 
somebody else’.  581 
 582 
In examining the cost performance of public infrastructure projects an illustrative case study was 583 
undertaken. Cost information from 67 projects constructed between 2011 and 2014 were 584 
provided by a contracting organization. The cost overruns/underruns that were experienced were 585 
calculated from the contract award to when final accounts were completed. The analysis revealed 586 
that the cost performance of projects ranged from -42.88% to + 270.93%, with a mean cost 587 
overrun of 23.75%. and a probability of occurring of 73%. In alignment with previous research 588 
no significant differences in the magnitude of cost overruns were found to exist by a project’s 589 
contract value, types, and procurement method. It revealed that change-orders accounted for a 590 
significant proportion of the cost overruns that emerged in the projects, with a mean of 10.6% as 591 
a proportion of the original contract value. Notably, significant differences were found to occur 592 
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between a project’s size and change-orders; that is, those with a smaller original contract value 593 
experienced a smaller volume of change-orders. 594 
 595 
Limited knowledge has existed about the margins that contractors apply to projects. However, 596 
the mean margin applied to the sample of public sector projects was revealed to be 9.89%, and 597 
the likelihood of such a value being applied was computed to be 62%.  The analysis revealed that 598 
the margin applied by the contractor did not vary with project type, its size and the procurement 599 
method being used to construct the asset. The analysis also demonstrated a positive association 600 
with an increase in change-orders and the contractor’s margin. More specifically it was found 601 
that contractor’s margins increase with larger cost overruns. A significant proportion of the 602 
projects were delivered using traditional ‘Construct Only’ and there is no incentive for 603 
contractors reduce change-orders as they have had no involvement in the design process. Even 604 
when the contractor was involved in the design process, change-orders still occurred, though 605 
their extent was unable to be determined.  606 
 607 
Involving the contractor as early as possible in the design process, providing incentives, and 608 
open-book tendering are considerations that should be enacted as initial steps to mitigate change-609 
orders. As the public sector embraces the era of digitization, which is being enabled by Building 610 
Information Modelling, the need to integrate design and construction and engender collaboration 611 
is imperative to ensure assets can be delivered cost effectively and future-proofed. Emphasis 612 
here should not necessarily be placed on the technology but ensuring information is structured in 613 
a standardized format, captured, openly-shared, stored and accessible so that parties can 614 
effectively work in a collaborative environment. The research in this paper provides invaluable 615 
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empirical evidence, though based on a limited dataset of 67 projects, to support the need for a 616 
change to the way the public sector procures their assets. If change is not embraced, then cost 617 
overruns will continue to be a nemesis.  618 
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